El Farol revisited: A note on emergence, game theory, and society

Journal Article


The El Farol paper examined the evolution of behavior of visits to a potentially crowded facility, providing an insightful view of how independent agents can coordinate in a “good enough” manner in many situations. This view is extended to considering the interaction between rules and behavior. The context may be such that the importance of the outcome is sufficiently high to merit an extra layer of complexity in the guidance of the emergent behavior and that behavior may signal the need for the additional complexity. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity, 2011

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