Genetic learning in strategic form games

Journal Article


We analyze the learning behavior of a Simple Genetic Algorithm in symmetric 3 × 3 Strategic‐Form‐Games. In cases of contests within one population and also between two populations the behavior of the SGA is compared with the behavior of the replicator dynamics and is analyzed with respect to equilibrium concepts in evolutionary game theory. Furthermore conservative non‐adaptive strings are added to the population which lead to convergence to an equilibrium even in “GA‐deceptive” games where the equilibrium can not be reached by GAs using only selection and crossover.

Related Topics

Related Publications

Related Content

Site Footer


This website is provided by John Wiley & Sons Limited, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex PO19 8SQ (Company No: 00641132, VAT No: 376766987)

Published features on are checked for statistical accuracy by a panel from the European Network for Business and Industrial Statistics (ENBIS)   to whom Wiley and express their gratitude. This panel are: Ron Kenett, David Steinberg, Shirley Coleman, Irena Ograjenšek, Fabrizio Ruggeri, Rainer Göb, Philippe Castagliola, Xavier Tort-Martorell, Bart De Ketelaere, Antonio Pievatolo, Martina Vandebroek, Lance Mitchell, Gilbert Saporta, Helmut Waldl and Stelios Psarakis.