International Journal of Economic Theory

Rationality, strategic uncertainty, and belief diversity in non‐cooperative games

Early View


I investigate the existence of epistemic models of complete information games that satisfy the following properties: players do not rule out their opponent's use of rational ex ante strategies for deriving their choices; they do not rule out, ex ante, that they can come to know the action profile that is ultimately played; and they do not rule out strategic uncertainty. In this paper I show that for a large class of games there are no epistemic models that satisfy these three properties.

Related Topics

Related Publications

Related Content

Site Footer


This website is provided by John Wiley & Sons Limited, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex PO19 8SQ (Company No: 00641132, VAT No: 376766987)

Published features on are checked for statistical accuracy by a panel from the European Network for Business and Industrial Statistics (ENBIS)   to whom Wiley and express their gratitude. This panel are: Ron Kenett, David Steinberg, Shirley Coleman, Irena Ograjenšek, Fabrizio Ruggeri, Rainer Göb, Philippe Castagliola, Xavier Tort-Martorell, Bart De Ketelaere, Antonio Pievatolo, Martina Vandebroek, Lance Mitchell, Gilbert Saporta, Helmut Waldl and Stelios Psarakis.