International Transactions in Operational Research

Social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis

Early View


We analyze the impact of social externalities (SEs) on the stability of an international environmental agreement (IEA). We consider a framework in which players are divided into two homogeneous groups, namely, developed and developing countries. We assume that members of an IEA get some additional benefits, to which we refer as SEs. One main result is that any coalition that is internally stable will expand to include all countries, which is related to the minimum participation clause considered in some papers. However, our minimum, which is endogenously defined, is not the largest stable coalition size, but the grand coalition.

Related Topics

Related Publications

Related Content

Site Footer


This website is provided by John Wiley & Sons Limited, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex PO19 8SQ (Company No: 00641132, VAT No: 376766987)

Published features on are checked for statistical accuracy by a panel from the European Network for Business and Industrial Statistics (ENBIS)   to whom Wiley and express their gratitude. This panel are: Ron Kenett, David Steinberg, Shirley Coleman, Irena Ograjenšek, Fabrizio Ruggeri, Rainer Göb, Philippe Castagliola, Xavier Tort-Martorell, Bart De Ketelaere, Antonio Pievatolo, Martina Vandebroek, Lance Mitchell, Gilbert Saporta, Helmut Waldl and Stelios Psarakis.